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Unions, Training, and Firm Performance 
 
The present paper uses a combination of workplace and linked employee-workplace data 
from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey and the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey to examine the impact of unions on training incidence, training 
intensity/coverage, and training duration. It also examines the impact of unions and training 
on earnings and a measure of establishment labour productivity. In addition, the implications 
of training for the firm’s bottom line are evaluated. Union effects on training emerge as fairly 
subtle, and are more positive when using individual rather than plant-wide training data. A 
positive impact of training on earnings is detected in both the individual and plant-wide wage 
data, albeit only for the earlier survey. Consistent with other recent findings, the effects of 
union recognition on earnings are today rather muted, while union-training interaction effects 
vary greatly. Instrumenting training provides positive results for the labour productivity 
outcome and, in the case of the earlier survey, for the financial performance indicator as well. 
However, some negative effects of unions are now also detected. 
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I.  Introduction 
The issues of the productivity of workplace training and union impact on firm performance are two 
of the more controversial issues in applied labour economics. The training question is complicated 
by the diversity of training forms, measurement difficulties, and the likelihood that training 
participants and training firms will differ materially from their counterparts without (or with less) 
training. The empirical evidence from individual and firm data is mixed, especially as regards the 
productivity of on-the-job or internal training.   
For its part, the union literature is in one sense more settled but lacks definition in the sense 
that the manner in which unions may influence workforce performance has been a black box. 
Implicitly, the major exception to this statement is training. Thus, in their early study of 
productivity using state-by-industry aggregates, Brown and Medoff (1978) attempted to go behind 
their finding of a positive union productivity differential of between 22 and 30 per cent by 
including a quit rate variable in the union-augmented production function. The effect was to reduce 
the union coefficient estimate by around one-fifth. In the years since this pioneering study, 
however, interest in the mechanisms through which unions might raise productivity has waned in 
line with much reduced estimates of the magnitude of that differential at lower levels of 
aggregation (the U.S. literature is reviewed in Hirsch, 2004, and the British literature in Addison 
and Belfield, 2004, and Metcalf, 2003). But the potential for greater training in union regimes 
(facilitated in part by reduced voluntary turnover) and the issue of its productivity are no less valid 
topics of empirical inquiry today than heretofore. Indeed, in Britain at least, there is evidence of 
heightened interest in these issues partly because of an apparent sea change in union impact on firm 
performance allied in part to bargaining structure, and partly because of research into the impact of 
high performance work practices (e.g. Wood and de Menezes 1998; Metcalf, 2003).   3
In the present study, we seek to examine these links using private-sector establishment data 
for Britain. Specifically, we consider the determinants of training to include unionism and then 
examine the impact of unions and training on earnings, labour productivity, and financial 
performance. Although we have information on just one type of training – namely, employer-
provided off-the-job training – we shall consider its influence along three dimensions: incidence, 
intensity (strictly, coverage) and duration. We also deploy both individual and plant-level measures 
of training. Our earnings analysis likewise uses linked employer-employee data as well as plant-
level average earnings. In investigating the impact of the two key variables on labour productivity 
and financial performance, however, we shall use plant-level information alone because of the very 
limited sampling of workers. In our analysis of plant performance, we will allow for the 
endogeneity of training.  
 To motivate the present study, we first outline the circumstances in which unions might 
influence training investments by the firm, and the manner in which the productivity of such 
investments has been addressed in the existing literature. We next describe the datasets used in this 
inquiry. There follows a detailed presentation of our findings. A brief summary concludes.   
 
II.  Theoretical Conjectures and the Existing Literature 
 
At the level of theory,
 unions might be associated with either more or less training.
 A negative 
union effect might be expected if the union premium impairs the ability of employees to finance 
training. Assuming that labour markets are perfect, general training investments should be paid for 
by the worker since the skills learned are transferable and are thus fully appropriable by workers. 
Just as with a binding minimum wage, the payment of union wages prevents workers from taking a 
wage cut and financing their general training investments. More generally, seniority rules and wage 
compression may also reduce the worker’s incentive to undertake or invest in training.
1   4
Furthermore, the scale of such negative effects of unions on training might be expected to vary 
directly with union strength or bargaining power. 
The literature has focused on the situations in which unions can stimulate training. Thus, the 
expression of union voice, underwritten by the wage premium, should cut down on labor turnover 
and increase the incentive of the employer to invest in firm-specific training because of the longer 
payback period (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). A more thorough-going application of the collective 
voice model would of course encompass workplace governance. A number of aspects of a 
governance apparatus may be expected to facilitate training by foreclosing the opportunities for 
workers to behave opportunistically. But a governance apparatus that includes unions may 
counteract the tendency of the employer to misrepresent his private information. More concretely, 
there may be a hold-up problem on the part of the employer: firms might hold-up the sunk 
investments of workers in training, leading to an under-investment in human capital. Here the union 
could act to prevent the hold-up problem by making the firm honour its commitments (Menezes-
Filho and Van Reenen, 2003, p. 299).  
The unions-as-a-commitment-device or agent of contract enforcement – first discussed by 
Malcomson (1983) – can be extended to cover the firm-financing of general training investments in 
circumstances where long-term wage contracts are otherwise infeasible. For example, Dustmann 
and Schönberg (2004) argue that (German) firms will pay for apprentice training because of the 
union-imposed wage floors that lead to wage compression. Wage compression allows productivity 
to rise faster than wages and the union wage level act as a guarantee against subsequent employer 
opportunism. Related models suggesting that unions may move general training closer to the social 
optimum either emphasize asymmetric information with respect to incumbent and outside forms, in   5
conjunction with wage compression (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) or complementarities between 
general training and specific training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999). 
 Past British (if not U.S.) work on the determinants of training has generally reported a 
positive union effect. That is, not only older research using union density (e.g. Greenhalgh and 
Mavrotas, 1994; Arulampalam, Booth, and Elias, 1995) but also more recent research using the 
preferred metric of union recognition point to a statistically significant direct association between 
unionism and training. Thus, for example, using individual data from the 1993 Quarterly Labor 
Force Survey and establishment-level data from the 1991 Employers’ Manpower and Skills 
Practices Survey, Green, Machin, and Wilkinson (1999) report that the incidence of training is 
positively related to union recognition. Union recognition is also reported to lead to an increased 
duration of that training in hours/days. Reflecting recent British preoccupations, the authors also 
examine the role of bargaining structure. The argument is that the union wage will be higher where 
there are multiple unions that bargain separately at the workplace, with higher wages discouraging 
employers from paying for training courses (Green, Machin, and Wilkinson, 1999, p. 181). They 
report that neither the incidence nor the duration of training (from the employer survey) is affected 
by multiple unionism at the workplace.
2 Interestingly, there is some indication in this study that the 
positive impact of union recognition on training may be increased in the presence of employee 
involvement mechanisms.  
Similarly, in an exercise that matches employee to establishment data from the WERS98, 
Böheim and Booth (2004) report a positive correlation between union recognition and employer-
provided training in the private sector for three out of the four worker groups identified, namely, 
manual and nonmanual males and nonmanual females. In an expanded model that takes account of 
bargaining structure, the main change is that for male manual workers training incidence is only   6
higher under union recognition where there is multiple unionism with joint bargaining. Otherwise, 
bargaining structure has no separate effect on training incidence. 
The incidence (and extent) of workplace training is one thing, its productive impact quite 
another. The traditional approach in Britain to measuring the productivity of training has been via 
earnings functions (some limitations of which are noted below).
3 Although there is an extensive 
literature on the impact of educational investments that dealing explicitly with work-related training 
is less developed. Nevertheless, most studies point to statistically significant positive returns to 
such training (see the survey by Cohn and Addison, 1998) even if few address the interaction 
between unionism and training.
4      
Two  recent studies by Forth and Millward (2004) and Booth, Francesconi, and Zoega 
(2003) merit attention. The principal focus of the former study is on the role of high performance 
workplace practices, including employee involvement. Using matched employee-employer data 
from the WERS98 for the private sector – the wage, training, and human capital/demographic 
variables are taken from the employee component of the survey and the establishment data from the 
employer component of the survey (see the data section below) – Forth and Millward report that 
(log) earnings are strongly positively related to certain training durations (viz. 1-2 days and 2-5 
days) relative to no training. Some effect of high performance work practices is also found, 
seemingly underwritten by job security guarantees. As far as unionism is concerned, only its direct 
effect on earnings is estimated. Although union recognition is associated with a wage premium of 
around 10 percent, this arises only in circumstances of multiunionism (under both single-table and 
separate bargaining). That is, there is no such wage differential when there is only a single 
recognized union at the workplace. Forth and Millward note the results of interacting high 
performance work practices with unionism, arguing that the premium associated with the former is   7
augmented under multiple unionism. But, to repeat, they do not interact unionism with the training 
argument. 
This omission is tackled by Booth, Francesconi, and Zoega (2003) in a study using 
information from the British Household Panel Survey Data for a balanced panel of full-time males, 
1991-96. The analysis considers both the duration of employer-provided training as in Forth and 
Millward (but now as a continuous rather than a categorical variable) and also its incidence. The 
authors find that union-covered workers are significantly more likely to receive training (between 5 
and 9 percentage points) and to receive longer training (between 3 and 4 days) than their non-
covered counterparts. (The lower estimates are for the panel estimates.) Moreover, the effects of 
training on wages are found to vary positively with union coverage, even as the positive effect of 
training on wages found using OLS is not replicated in fixed effects estimates. Taking the authors’ 
fixed effects estimates for incidence, for example, it is found that union workers who receive any 
training earn roughly 6 percent more than their uncovered counterparts, half of which is the simple 
union premium. The effect of training duration is small, although the interaction of intensity and 
union recognition is again positive and statistically significant. Finally, in a separate analysis of 
wage growth that allows for changes in collective bargaining status and training incidence/duration, 
the main result is that gaining coverage is much more important for earnings growth than receiving 
training or obtaining longer training without gaining union coverage. In short, there is little in these 
data to suggest that unionism is associated with lower returns to training or lower wage growth.  
But if unions do not reduce the incentives to acquire work-related training it is too early to 
conclude from one study that the productivity of training in union plants is higher than in nonunion 
establishments. Moreover, as Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen (2000, p. 6) caution, earnings “only 
tell half the story.” The course of earnings reflects not only value marginal product development   8
but also the share principle covering training investments (both firm-specific and also general 
training in the light of recent theoretical developments stressing labour market imperfections), 
effort-motivating career wage profiles, product market imperfections, and indeed other types of 
training investments (principally informal types of training on which the standard data sets are 
silent). It is therefore necessary to supplement the earnings function approach with a more direct 
measure of productivity than the wage. Indeed, testing modern theories of wage compression and 
training require such data to test the implication that productivity increases faster than earnings. 
There is a small but growing training-in-the-production-function literature. A summary of 
the main studies is consigned to Appendix Table 1.
5  As can be seen, just one study is for Britain, 
namely, Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen’s (2000, 2006) analysis of a panel of industries between 
1983 and 1996, and where the training information is derived from the Labour Force Survey. The 
study is notable for its use of an extended panel with information on training and productivity for 
each year of the sample period. This enables the authors to deal with problems of unobserved 
heterogeneity (some industries may have lower rates of technological change and therefore offer 
less scope for training) and endogeneity (training may be undertaken when its opportunity costs is 
lower as when firms experience transitory demand shocks) using GMM system methods. The 
upshot of this approach is that weak training effects on productivity detected in OLS are 
considerably strengthened using a within group estimator and further strengthened using a GMM 
estimator with endogenous training. In robustness tests, the authors report that collective voice 
effects do not seem to underpin the stronger training results: the point estimate of training is little 
affected by the inclusion of a union measure (viz. density) (only available from 1989 onward) while 
the coefficient estimate for unionism is negative albeit statistically insignificant. (We note   9
parenthetically that the union variable when considered alongside training in the production 
function literature is often statistically insignificant.) 
Finally, Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen offer a parallel earnings function analysis. 
Familiarly, the strong association between training and wages is considerably reduced with controls 
for skills, but is stronger in the within group estimates and more so using the GMM estimator. But 
the wage gradient of training is half the productivity gradient, leading the authors to conclude that 
the earnings function approach “ignores the benefits the firm may capture through higher profits” 
(Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen, 2000, p. 53). 
One problem with this important study apart from its neglect of the union-training nexus – 
the production function studies in Appendix Table 1 typically ignore union impact
6  and none 
considers the productivity of training in union and nonunion regimes
 – is possible aggregation bias.
 
That said, this level of analysis may capture externalities from training (knowledge spillovers) that 
perforce escape identification at the firm level. 
The bottom line is that some progress has been made in charting the impact of unions on 
workplace training and of training on earnings and output.  However, only limited progress has 
been made in determining how unionism might mediate the impact of training on earnings, and 
there has been no examination of this interaction for performance measures other than earnings. 
The present exercise seeks in part to redress this imbalance. It does so by exploring the 
determinants of training  in a framework that investigates the impact of training and union 
recognition on two subjective measures of firm performance, namely, relative labour productivity 
and financial performance in addition to earnings.   
 
III.  Data   10
Our data are taken from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98) and the 2004 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS04). Each survey follows closely the format of 
the earlier Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys/WIRS (for 1980, 1984, and 1990), albeit with 
some differences (see Cully et al., 1999). WERS98 is a national survey of 2,191 British 
establishments in the public and private sectors with at least 10 workers; respectively, the WERS04 
has data on 2,295 establishments with at least 5 workers. Otherwise, the surveys are almost 
identical in terms of questions, sampling frames, and representation of workplaces across the 
British economy.  The main focus of the surveys is a management questionnaire that provides 
detailed information on the composition of the workforce, management of the personnel function, 
representation at work, consultation and communication, payment systems and pay determination, 
workplace flexibility, and (largely qualitative) information on workplace performance.  In addition, 
25 employees at each workplace – or all employees at smaller establishments – are randomly 
selected for an employee questionnaire.
7 The individual worker questionnaire inquires of the 
employee respondent the nature of the job held, the training received, attitudes towards the 
organization and management, representation at work, as well as educational level and earnings. 
Unlike earlier WIRS, therefore, WERS98 and WERS04 include information on both individual and 
workplace characteristics.  Both surveys also have high response rates.  Using both 1998 and 2004 
data illuminates changes in workplaces over time as well as providing a very recent description of 
British workplaces.  (More details are provided in Kersley et al., 2005).  
For that part of our analysis dealing with the determinants of training and the effect of 
training on wages, we will match the employee and workplace (i.e. management survey) 
components of WERS98/WERS04. We shall also present parallel results using workplace data on 
training and earnings information from the management survey. Earnings from the employee   11
questionnaire are in the form of gross weekly earnings that are reported in twelve earnings bands.
8 
Using the relevant midpoint value in conjunction with reported hours of work, we derive a measure 
of gross hourly wages. Earnings from the management survey are in the form of gross annual 
wages in six earnings bands. Using midpoint values – this time in association with the number of 
workers populating each band – we are able to construct a measure of plant ‘median’ earnings.  
The critical training variable also differs as between the two components of 
WERS98/WERS04, even if in each case it refers to formal off-the-job training. For the employee 
survey the training question asks: “During the last 12 months, how much training have you had, 
either paid for or organized by your employer?”
9  The employee is asked is required to tick one of 
six 6 boxes: ‘none,’ ‘less than 1 day,’ ‘1 to less than 2 days,’ ‘2 to less than 5 days,’ ‘5 to less than 
10 days,’ and ‘10 days or more’). From these responses, we construct two training measures: first, 
we define training incidence to take the value of 1 if the respondent received any such training, 
zero otherwise; second, we define training duration as either 0 or the midpoint of the reported 
bands.  
The (main) training question in the management survey asks: “What proportion of 
experienced employees in the largest occupational group have had formal off the job training over 
the past 12 months?”
10 There are seven possible responses, comprising upper and lower limits of 
‘all’ and ‘none’ and five intermediate bands. We define training incidence to be 1 where the 
employer responds that more than 0 percent received training. We also use the question to define 
training intensity (or coverage), assigning the plant to one of the seven intervals, using the 
midpoints of the bands as appropriate. We also employ responses to a second training question in 
the employer survey to derive a measure of training duration analogous to that contained in the 
employee survey. This second question asks the employer to identify which of six intervals best   12
describes “on average, about how much time did these… employees … spend in formal off-the-job 
training sessions over the past 12 months?” We weight these hourly values by the corresponding 
intensity or coverage values to produce an estimate of plant-level training duration. 
In addition to the conventional use of earnings as a performance indicator (see the literature 
review), we also use two other outcome indicators, namely, labour productivity and financial 
performance, taken from the management survey. Given the partial sampling of employees in the 
employee survey, we do not link these data to the employee survey. Thus, when we form an 
instrument for training for inclusion in the performance equations (see below) this is based on 
plant-level data alone. 
We next briefly describe the labour productivity and financial performance dependent 
variables. Each is subjective, the manager respondent being asked to “assess your workplace’s 
labour productivity/financial performance” vis-à-vis the average of “other establishments in the 
same industry.” Responses in each case are coded ‘a lot better/better than average,’ ‘above 
average,’ ‘about average,’ and ‘a lot below/below average.’ For both indicators, we define above 
average performance as 1 (combining the first three responses), zero otherwise.
11    
Our measure(s) of unionism is the same across all estimations and is a plant-level measure. 
Union recognition is set equal to 1 if the employer recognizes any trade union at the place of work 
for the purpose of negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of the workforce. We also use an 
alternative measure of unionism based on bargaining structure.  Vis-à-vis no recognition (the 
omitted category), we identify circumstances in which the employer bargained with a single union 
or with multiple unions either jointly (i.e. single-table bargaining) or severally.  
The remaining variables are more easily described because they have been widely used in 
previous empirical work. Thus, the equations using as dependent variables individual-level   13
earnings and training data from the employee questionnaire contain standard human capital 
arguments (such as educational attainment, occupational controls, and age and tenure) and 
demographic controls (such as marital status, gender, and ethnicity). They also include the same 
workplace covariates as are used in all equations based on management survey data alone – other 
than those used to identify the plant-level training equations fitted to those data. In addition to 
various high performance working practices (described below), the workplace-level arguments 
include labour force composition (proportion of female, part-time, and manual workers), plant and 
wider organization characteristics (establishment/organizational size, status as a single operating 
establishment or otherwise, and capital intensity), product market competition, firm ownership, and 
(eight) industry dummies. 
As for the high performance working practices, these comprise team working (at least 60 
percent of employees work in the largest occupational group work in formally designated teams), 
quality circles (presence of workplace groups that solve specific problems or discuss aspects of 
performance or quality), briefing groups (a system of briefing nonmanagerial employees at the 
workplace that occurs at least monthly and where at least 10  percent of time is dedicated to 
questions/contributions from employees), information disclosure, (management regularly provides 
workers with information on the plant’s financial situation and external investment plans), and 
financial participation (based on eligibility to participate in an ESOP arrangement or profit- or 
performance-related pay). We do not allow for the bundling such practices or for their frequency 
and intensity (on which, see Forth and Millward, 2004) as our main interest lies elsewhere.  
One practice that is often considered to belong to the group of innovative work practices is 
job security guarantees. We would anticipate that job security guarantees either call for a more 
flexible (i.e. more highly trained) workforce or stimulate training in the downturn. Two other rather   14
more obvious training-related arguments proxy the scope for training and the priority accorded 
training. As an indicator of the scope for training, we deploy a dummy variable set equal to 1 if 
normally takes at least one month before new employees in the largest occupational group are able 
to do their job, and 0 if less than that. And, as an indicator of the priority accorded training, we use 
another dichotomous variable that assumes the value of 1 if the establishment sets targets for 
workplace training, 0 otherwise. All three variables are used to help identify the training equation.   
In addition, these three variables are used as instruments for training in our labour 
productivity and financial performance equations. Recognizing that outcomes may be 
endogenously determined with the decision to provide training, we perform an instrumental 
variables regression.  Predicted values for each measure of training – along with their interactions 
with unionism – replace the endogenous regressor (the direct measures of training). 
Finally, we restrict our analysis to the private sector and use the sampling weights given in 
the two surveys. For the WERS98, our cross sections overall cover 17,092 individuals with 
complete data on 1,100 establishments.  The corresponding values for the WERS04 are 13,643 
individuals and 1,449 establishments. 
Descriptive statistics for the matched employee-employer sample and for the workplace 
sample are reported in Appendix Tables 2 and 3, respectively. For the former sample, the incidence 
of training across the two surveys is quite similar, at 51 percent and 59 percent. Most 
establishments offer some form of training, with the rate higher in 2004. For training intensity, 
more firms offer either all or few workers training in 2004 whereas the spread was more even in 
1998.  The durations of training are also similar: the mean duration of training is 2.86 days for the 
WERS 1998 and 2.71 for the WERS 2004. However, union recognition is lower in 2004 – at 43 
percent compared with 51 percent in 1998. The difference is mainly explained by the lower rate of   15
multiple unionism in 2004. For the latter workplace samples, the measures for financial 
performance and labour productivity are very close; just over one-half of firms are identified as 
having financial performance “better than average” and almost exactly half report “better than 
average” labour productivity. The workplace-level data do, however, reveal a much sharper 
difference in union recognition: with 42 percent of workplaces being recognized in 1998 versus just 
15 percent in the 2004 sample.   
 
IV.  Findings 
 
Our starting point is the determinants of training and earnings. In each case, we will provide results 
using both individual and plant-level measures of training and earnings. As noted above, the former 
information (as well as the human capital and demographic measures) are derived from the 
employee questionnaire of each WERS and are also matched to establishment-level information 
from the management questionnaires. This part of our analysis corresponds most closely with the 
existing British literature. Our separate results using plant-level training information are based on 
workplace-level data from the management surveys alone and are organically linked to the 
subsequent analyses of plant productivity and financial performance. 
(Table 1 near here) 
Table 1 provides summary probit and tobit regression results for individual-level training 
incidence and duration, respectively, using two measures of unionism in each case. Panel (a) 
provides results from the WERS98, and panel (b) from the WERS04. As can be seen, whether or 
not a worker receives training appears uninfluenced by the union recognition status of the plant or 
by the structure of collective bargaining. Results for the full set of regressors – not provided in the 
table but available from the authors upon request – reveal that comparatively few of the variables   16
taken from the employee surveys are statistically significant.
12 Rather, plant-level variables tend to 
dominate. Thus, the likelihood that the worker receives training frequency is higher the larger the 
plant and where the organization deploys high performance work practices, and it is lower the 
larger the share of part-timers and manual workers in the workforce and in single-plant firms.   
For its part, training duration also appears unaffected by union recognition per se in either 
the WERS98 or the WERS04. But for the former dataset at least differences emerge by bargaining 
structure: compared with plants without union recognition, workers in establishments that bargain 
with multiple (single) unions offer longer (shorter) training spells over the course of a year. For the 
WERS04 although the coefficient estimates for all forms of collective bargaining are positive, none 
approaches statistical significance at conventional levels. Most of the plant-level variables found to 
influence training incidence operate in the same manner with respect to training duration. 
Interestingly, in the case of the WERS98, the role of the human capital and demographic variables 
taken from the employee survey assume much more importance for training duration than they did 
for training incidence. (Notable across both datasets is a decline in the duration of training with age 
and tenure.)  Also of interest is the finding across both datasets that U.K.-owned plants offer shorter 
training spells than their foreign-owned counterparts.  
(Table 2 near here) 
The corresponding results for training using plant-level variables alone are given in Table 2. 
The equations now include three plant-level measures not encountered in Table 1 that are used to 
identify our plant-level training equation for subsequent stages of the analysis (on which more 
below). The results given in the first four columns of the table refer to the incidence and coverage 
of training by union measure, while the last two relate to our imputed duration of training measure.  
The most notable result is the general statistical insignificance of the union variable. Union   17
recognition is not statistically significant in any model. For the WERS98 the different collective 
bargaining structures show either insignificant or inconclusive impacts: for incidence, single-table 
bargaining is positive; for duration, multiple bargaining is negative. For the WERS04 no union 
variable attains statistical significance. 
Interestingly, two out of the three variables we consider as identifiers – picking up the scope 
for training (time taken for new workers to become proficient) and the priority accorded training 
(targets set for workplace training) – are both positive and well determined across all six 
regressions for the WERS98. Although the variable proxying the need for a more flexible 
workforce and/or suggestive of more training in the downturn plays no role for the WERS98, the 
opposite is true for the WERS04 where the coefficient estimate for job security guarantees is 
statistically significant in four out of six specifications. Training is higher in the WERS04, as in the 
WERS98, when targets are set for workplace training but there is no indication that the time taken 
for new workers to become proficient in a job is a determinant of either the intensity or duration of 
training in the later dataset. 
As far as the other covariates are concerned, across both data sets the results for training 
frequency (incidence and coverage) in the first four columns are roughly coincident. Thus, training 
frequency is declining in the share of part-timers and manual workers and increasing in 
establishment size and with three out of four high performance work practices. For training 
duration, although much the same arguments are statistically significant for the WERS98 the results 
are weaker for the WERS04. Interestingly, older establishments seem to train workers longer in 
both surveys. 
The impact of training and unions on (log) hourly pay using matched employee-
establishment data is shown in Table 3A. As before, two characterizations of unionism are   18
provided. Also as before, we consider both training incidence and duration and all specifications 
include interactions between training and unionism. Table 3B supplements this analysis with results 
for the categorical measure of training duration, using the actual bands identified in the employee 
questionnaire, although in this case only the union recognition argument is deployed for reasons of 
expositional convenience. 
(Tables 3A and 3B near here) 
There are few points of agreement as regards the estimates in panels (a) and (b) of Table 
3A. Beginning with the WERS98, then, it seems to be the case that training incidence, if not 
duration, is positively associated with earnings but union recognition per se is not, while the 
interaction between training incidence and union recognition is positive and marginally significant. 
Once we amend the union measure to reflect bargaining structure, it can be seen that (direct) union 
effects on earnings seem to be confined to multiple unionism, while the interaction between 
unionism and training incidence is positive and significant for one type of multiple unionism, 
namely, where there is single-table bargaining. Where training duration is expressed as a 
continuous variable neither it nor union recognition is statistically significant, and the same is true 
of their interaction. Nevertheless, the union argument alone is well determined in the case of 
multiunionism. Once training duration is entered in categorical form, it can be seen from Table 3B 
that some intermediate levels of training have well determined positive effects. While the union 
recognition coefficient estimate in this specification is now strongly significant, those of the 
interaction terms are negative – the one exception is the interaction with training of ten days 
duration or more where training itself is not positively associated with wages.  
Turning to the WERS04 in Table 3A, one notable result is the virtual absence of any union 
effect on earnings. This outcome is not unexpected and seems to mark a further reduction in what   19
we might generically term the disadvantages of unionism (Addison and Belfield, 2004). No less 
notable is the general absence of a positive effect of training on wages. In the case of training 
incidence, training only achieves statistical significance when interacted with one of the 
(multiunionism) bargaining structure arguments. Exactly the same result applies for training 
duration in continuous form. Only when we consider training duration in categorical form (Table 
3B) are both union and training effects more evident, and more in line with the WERS98. Unions 
have a small but well determined positive effect on wages, and all training intervals – with the 
exception of the shortest and longest spells – are associated with higher earnings. That said, there is 
less suggestion of material interactions in either direction between union recognition and training 
duration.
13    
By way of summary, our findings up to this point differ from those reported in the literature 
in a number of important respects. One is the absence of any simple effect of unions on training 
incidence, duration, or coverage. And while our findings on the union wage premium are consistent 
with the literature – in denying a simple association between unionism and pay and noting that the 
premium where observed (for the WERS98) hinges on bargaining structure – the near absence of 
significantly positive interaction effects between unionism and training conflicts with the optimistic 
findings of the one British study to have investigated this issue.
14       
These observations and the limitations of wages as a measure of productivity led us to 
consider whether stronger effects of training (and unions) might be discernible using the labour 
productivity question in each workplace survey, as well as the longer-term financial performance 
indicator. It will be recalled that both indicators are dummy variables where above average 
performance equals 1, zero otherwise. Initially, when we regressed our labour productivity measure 
on the reported values of various training and union arguments, the results were unspectacular. In   20
the case of the WERS98, for example, just one association was statistically significant (a negative 
coefficient estimate for single-table bargaining under multiple unionism). For WERS04, the union 
effects were more clearly negative, and the training results weakly positive. 
Given possible endogeneity bias, both performance equations were duly estimated with 
predicted rather than actual training values. We instrumented our three plant-level training 
variables using the specifications in Table 2.  The validity of the instrumental variables estimation 
depends on finding variables correlated with the endogenous regressor (training), but uncorrelated 
with the performance measures. As shown in Table 2, two of our three instrumental variables are 
strongly correlated with training incidence, intensity, and duration. When these variables were 
included in the labour productivity and financial performance equations they evinced very weak 
explanatory power (the strongest effect being the experience requirement, although this too was 
inconsistent). Next, we ran all the equations (six per outcome indicator) using the reported training 
values. A comparison of the coefficient estimates for actual and predicted training – a direct 
Hausman test was not performed because the equations are not OLS – revealed that in most cases 
(all cases for the WERS04) the latter exceeded the former, while preserving levels of statistical 
significance. Moreover, the union status variables were unaffected. Finally, we performed an 
augmented regression test, as proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 236). Specifically, 
we included both the actual and predicted measures of training together in each of the performance 
equations: circumstances in which the coefficient on the predicted training measure is statistically 
significant can be interpreted as indicating that that the instrumental variables approach is 
consistent. For the WERS98, in seven of the twelve equations, the predicted measure of training 
was statistically significant (p<0.05) and the union coefficients were unaffected. For the WERS04,   21
on the other hand, the coefficients were mostly insignificant, reflecting the generally weaker results 
we review below.    
(Table 4 near here) 
  Turning therefore to the performance equations, panels (a) and (b) of Table 4 present the 
labour productivity results for WERS98 and WERS04, respectively, using instrumented plant-level 
training variables. For the earlier survey, the coefficient estimates for predicted training – 
incidence, intensity, and duration – are each positive and statistically significant. For its part, the 
simple union variable – union recognition – is with one exception poorly determined, and the 
interaction term between union recognition and the training measure is never statistically 
significant. For equations taking explicit account of the bargaining structure there are few 
statistically significant coefficients, except for single-table bargaining which shows a negative 
relationship to labour productivity. The results for the WERS04 are similar in several respects. 
Thus, the coefficient estimate for the predicted training argument is again positive and statistically 
significant throughout – albeit now only marginally so for training duration – and the simple union 
recognition variable is never statistically significant when interacted with predicted training. That 
said, single-table bargaining is now associated with higher labour productivity and conversely for 
separate bargaining with a number of unions. If these two latter results are regarded as more 
consistent with one’s priors, note however that the directional effects of each variable are reversed 
in interactions with predicted training. 
(Table 5 near here)  
         Finally, Table 5 charts the association between training, unions, and financial performance. 
Comparison of panels (a) and (b) of the table now indicates sharp differences between the two   22
workplace surveys. First, for the WERS98 predicted training is positively associated with above 
average financial performance, whereas for the WERS04 no such association is evident. Second, in 
results reminiscent of a much earlier literature, the effects of union recognition on financial 
performance are adverse in two out of three specifications for the WERS04, while no such negative 
effects are discerned for the WERS98. Third, single-table bargaining is associated with below 
average financial performance in the WERS98, whereas for the WERS04 it is separate bargaining 
with several unions that is associated with this outcome. The latter results pertaining to bargaining 
structure mirror those reported earlier in Table 4 for labour productivity (as do the respective   
interactions with predicted training).   
         Given the subjective nature of the productivity and financial performance variables, however, 
we should be wary of placing too much emphasis on the specifics of the above. Moreover, these 
results are non-commensurate with the earnings findings and it will be interesting to see if they will 
be corroborated using objective measures that can be fashioned out of the Financial Performance 
Questionnaire of WERS04. That said, there is a measure of consistency in the labour productivity 
results. Moreover, the type of training considered here does seem to be pro-productive and 
unionism does not seem to prejudice its payoff in any consistent manner.   
V.  Conclusions 
This study is the first using WERS data to examine the impact of training at the workplace on 
earnings, labour productivity, and financial performance. It does so in a framework that accords 
equal emphasis to labour unions. Contrary to the predictions of the simple competitive model at 
least, union recognition does not appear to reduce the frequency of employer-provided off-the-job 
training. Indeed, individual worker data suggest that training duration may be longer in certain   23
union bargaining regimes. Plant-level training data also contain no suggestion of any reduction in 
training incidence or coverage in union regimes, but do hint that training duration may be reduced 
in situations where multiple unions bargain separately.  
What of the productivity of training? Although there are some differences between the 
results obtained from individual and plant-level earnings data, the productivity of training is at least 
weakly confirmed in the earnings data. The suggestion that single-table bargaining may actually be 
associated with higher returns to training (incidence in the matched employee-employer regressions 
and to duration in the workplace-level estimates) has also to be considered alongside some other 
less positive results (specifically, negative interactions between union recognition and some 
training durations in the matched data).  
If we were to stop here, we might conclude that the balance of our evidence is more 
favourable to the new view of unionism than to the standard competitive model. But we are not 
speaking of a ringing endorsement, which recognition led us to experiment with a more direct 
measure of output than earnings. Our investigation of a subjective measure of labour productivity 
taken from the management survey cast some doubt on the new view of unionism while 
considerably strengthening the pro-productivity effects of training. In the former case, we are 
speaking of the appearance of some negative direct union effects rather than a reduced payoff to 
training in union regimes. Our separate analysis of financial performance produced results that 
were broadly consistent with the same-survey labour productivity results although only for the 
WERS98 was there the clear suggestion that training benefits the bottom line.    
  Finally, we should note the difficulties of measuring training and identifying its impacts 
across entire establishments.  Many individual workers may engage in and benefit from training, 
even in firms where little training is undertaken; these effects will be hard to capture if there is   24
significant within-firm variation in training compared to between-firm variation. Here we are 
constrained by the data, which ruled out the use of a fixed effects estimator. However, we were able 
to use both workplace and individual data, with multiple measures of wages, training, and 
unionization.  Moreover, our inquiry further looked to impacts along the dimensions of overall 
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Endnotes 
*The authors thank the sponsors of WERS (DTI, ACAS, ERSC, and PSI) and the ESRC Data 
Archive. 
1. The classic reference is Mincer (1983); see also Lindbeck et al. (1993).  
2. The authors’ actual variable is the presence of multiple unions at the workplace (interacted with 
union recognition), thus conflating separate and joint bargaining on the part of multiple unions.   
3. For a wide-ranging German study of the effect of training on earnings by type of employee and 
form of training, see Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003). 
4. A negative correlation between wages and training might be anticipated: during the training 
period, workers are not fully productive and will only become more productive after the training is 
concluded (Bartel, 1995).  (We appreciate the contribution of a reviewer in pointing this out.)  
However, our training measure is retrospective, extending over an entire year.  It therefore covers 
periods before, during, and after training. Nevertheless, we recognize that we may not have fully 
captured the wage effects of training. 
5. Additional studies not cited in the table would include Ballot et al. (2001) for France and 
Sweden, and Bellmann and Bücherl (2001) for Germany.  
6. An exception is Zwick (2005) who includes a codetermination variable (i.e. works council 
presence) as a regressor in his lagged productivity estimates of training intensity and alternative 
forms of training. Works council presence is associated with higher productivity in his OLS 
estimates. In his two-step panel estimates, however, codetermination is no longer statistically 
significant whether or not selection into training is accommodated.  He obtains stronger results for 
the works council variable in a subsequent paper examining training intensity alone (albeit over a   26
longer sample period) that also controls for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity between firms 
and the endogeneity of training (Zwick, 2006). Neither study tests whether the productivity effects 
of training are contingent on other establishment characteristics or the establishment’s environment, 
but in a separate treatment examining the effect of works councils on the productivity impact of 
direct employee participation, Zwick (2003) reports that the payoff to such practices is restricted to 
works council regimes. This study also looks at training, which is found to have a bigger payoff in 
works council regimes. Unlike employee participation, however, training is now assumed to be 
exogenous. 
7. It follows that the matched employee-employer aspect of the survey is considerably more limited 
than in other datasets, and, in particular, the German LIAB.  Also, because the two datasets are not 
longitudinal but harmonized cross-sectional surveys we cannot apply the techniques detailed by 
Abowd et al. (1999). 
8. For the highest and lowest bands, we compute a hypothetical midpoint assuming that the range 
matches that of the next and the previous earnings band, respectively. The selfsame procedure is 
used in the case of all other variables with open intervals.  Prior studies using WERS98 data have 
found that results are not sensitive to the method of banding. 
9. The employee is asked to “include only training away from your normal place of work, but it 
could be on or off the premises.”  More generally, we do not of course know how much training – 
more or less – the worker received in any preceding interval.  The same limitation attaches to the 
management questionnaire. 
10. The survey explicitly includes the prompt: “off the job training is training away from the 
normal place of work, but either on or off the premises.”   27
11. We note here that these are subjective measures of performance and productivity (financial data 
is not available for the WERS98); and as such we place more reliance on the results for earnings.  
Nevertheless, these measures have been used extensively in other empirical investigations into the 
determinants of firm performance (see Addison and Belfield, 2004).  
12. That said, for the WERS04 the coefficient estimates for gender and tenure as well as those for 
some of the education categories (and almost all of the occupational arguments) are well 
determined. 
13. We also fitted a (log median annual) wage equation to data from the management survey, using 
plant-level covariates alone.  This estimation serves as a check for plant-level wage effects from 
‘high-training’ firms.  For the WERS98 some statistically significant associations between training 
and wages were found for training intensity and training duration if not its incidence. There were 
no systematic union effects on earnings, and where significant the effects were inconclusive. 
Further, just two out of a total of twelve union-training interaction terms were statistically 
significant. For the WERS04 very few of the coefficients are statistically significant. In re-
estimating these wage equations excluding interaction terms, the coefficient estimates for each 
training measure were uniformly positive and statistically significant while those for unionism were 
always poorly determined in the case of the WERS98, and statistically insignificant throughout for 
the WERS04.  
14. We ran a series of sensitivity checks on the training determinants and wage equations using 
alternative estimation techniques. These techniques were applied to see if the coefficients were 
driven by unobservable firm-specific characteristics. (Full results are available from the authors 
upon request.) The first check was to re-estimate the wage equations to adjust for intra-firm 
correlations (using the post-estimation cluster command, see Moulton, 1986). The second   28
alternative was to apply a random effects estimator across firms. Overall, the changes were minor 
and again do not point to a consistent pattern of union influence on training or a more emphatic 
impact of unions and training on wages. For the WERS98, unions still do not increase training 
incidence whatever the configuration of unionism; although they do now elevate training duration, 
with single unions now no longer having a negative impact. The WERS04 coefficient estimates 
remain statistically insignificant at the .05 level. For wages, the impact of training incidence and its 
interactions is now weaker but the effects remain as strong for the duration measures in the 
WERS98. Again, no clear effects from unions or training emerge when using the WERS04.   29
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Table 1: Determinants of Training in Matched Employee-Employer Sample 
 
  Training Incidence  Training Duration 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
(a) WERS 1998:     
Union  -0.0011  -0.0667  
  (0.0318)  (0.1267)  
Single-table bargaining    0.0145    0.6972*** 
    (0.0485)          (0.1835) 
Joint bargaining     0.0321    0.6860*** 
    (0.0562)          (0.2023) 
Single union    -0.0117    -0.4665*** 
    (0.0348)          (0.1386) 
n  17092 17092 17092 17092 
      
(b) WERS 2004:     
Union  0.0442  0.1406  
  (0.0344)  (0.1500)  
Single-table  bargaining   0.0284  0.2498 
   (0.0498)  (0.2291) 
Joint  bargaining   0.0643  0.3964 
   (0.0604)  (0.2664) 
Single  union   0.0458  0.0411 
   (0.0384)  (0.1687) 
n  13643 13643 13732 13732 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Probit estimation of equations (1) and (2); Tobit estimation of equations (3) and 
(4).  The equations include the following individual covariates: gender; tenure; tenure squared; marital status; minority status; 
education (3 categories); children; disability; age (5); and occupation (8).  The equations include the following workplace 
covariates: establishment age; U.K.-owned; single firm; % female workers; % part-time workers; % manual; shift-workers; 
capital–labour ratio (3); employment size; market competitiveness (2); organization size (2); team work; quality circles; briefing 
groups; information disclosure; financial participation; industry (8); and a constant term and 8 industry-sector dummies.    
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.     
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Table 2:  Determinants of Training at Workplace Level 
 
  Training Incidence  Training  
Intensity 
Training Duration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
(a) WERS 1998:       
Union  0.0861  2.4125  -0.2540  
  (0.1328)  (2.8368)  (0.2281)  
Single-table  barg.  0.8585**   5.4552    -0.4880 
       (0.3905)    (4.3461)    (0.3475) 
Joint  barg.     -0.1687  -4.4933   -0.8369** 
   (0.2305)  (4.4728)       (0.3610) 
Single  union   0.0451  3.2029  -0.0378 
   (0.1437)  (3.1496)  (0.2534) 
0.3726*** 0.3939***  13.1535***  13.8603***  1.1682*** 1.2037***  Experience reqd. to 
do job >1 month  (0.1108)  (0.1132)  (2.5290) (2.5438) (0.2050) (0.2060) 
-0.0790 -0.0637 -1.3122 0.4570 -0.0708 0.0636  Job security 
guarantees  (0.4399) (0.4484) (6.5732) (6.6077) (0.5247) (0.5278) 
0.2207* 0.2302*  15.3616***  15.6911***  0.7102***  0.7451***  Targets set for 
training   (0.1198)   (0.1211)  (2.4336)  (2.4352)  (0.1960)  (0.1964) 
n  1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
        
(b) WERS 2004:       
Union  0.1043  5.6650  0.5066  
  (0.2391)  (3.7086)  (0.3244)  
Single-table  barg.   0.1908  7.2810  0.1289 
   (0.4002)  (6.8967)  (0.5822) 
Joint  barg.     0.2816  -9.5415  0.1424 
   (0.5082)   (11.1538)   (0.9169) 
Single  union   0.0824  6.4949  0.6272 
   (0.2619)  (3.9892)  (0.3491) 
Experience reqd. to   0.0539  0.0541  0.0775  0.0488  -0.3061  -0.3032 
do job >1 month  (0.1464)  (0.1465)  (2.4417) (2.4398) (0.2333) (0.2332) 
Job security   0.7448  0.7427  25.1900**  24.3222**  2.2711**  2.3316** 
guarantees  (0.4568) (0.4600) (8.3617) (8.4349) (0.7447) (0.7524) 
Targets set for   0.2708  0.2711  16.9754***  16.8804**  1.7193**  1.7156** 
training  (0.1670) (0.1671) (2.5222) (2.5207) (0.2232) (0.2232) 
n  1449 1449 1471 1471 1228 1228 
 
Notes: Probit estimation of  equations (1) and (2); Tobit estimation of  equations (3) through (6). Standard errors in parentheses. 
Equations include the following workplace covariates: establishment age; U.K.-owned; single firm; % female workers; % part-
time workers; % manual; shift-workers; capital–labour ratio (3 categories); employment size; market competitiveness (2); 
organization size (2); team work; quality circles; briefing groups; information disclosure; financial participation; industry (8); and 
a constant term and 8 industry-sector dummies.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
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Table 3A: Determinants of Log Hourly Pay with Training/Union Interactions 
 
  Training Measure 
  Incidence Incidence Duration  Duration 
(a) WERS 1998:     
Union  0.0086  0.0163  
  (0.0120)  (0.0101)  
Training   0.0266**  0.0312***  -0.0016  -0.0013 
     (0.0107)  (0.0107)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
Training * union  0.0311*    0.0026   
    (0.0164)    (0.0019)   
Single-table barg.    0.0369**    0.0722*** 
       (0.0172)    (0.0182) 
Joint  barg.     0.0750***  0.0666*** 
      (0.0199)    (0.0182) 
Single  union   -0.0012  -0.0039 
   (0.0135)  (0.0113) 
Training * Sing.-table barg.    0.0740***    0.0024 
   (0.0265)  (0.0033) 
Training * Joint barg.    -0.0001    0.0027 
   (0.0275)  (0.0030) 
Training * Single union    -0.0025    0.0003 
   (0.0183)  (0.0022) 
R
2 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.57 
n  17092 17092 17092 17092 
      
(b) WERS 2004:     
Union  0.0164  0.0118  
  (0.0165)  (0.0130)  
Training   -0.0022  -0.0023  0.0008  0.0008 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Training * union  0.0020    0.0020   
  (0.0023)  (0.0022)  
Single-table  barg.   0.0323  0.0201 
   (0.0263)  (0.0199) 
Joint  barg.     0.0145  0.0207 
   (0.0239)  (0.0201) 
Single  union   0.0128  0.0089 
   (0.0191)  (0.0148) 
Training * Sing.-table barg.    -0.0035    0.0002 
   (0.0037)  (0.0029) 
Training * Joint barg.    0.0102**    0.0109** 
   (0.0041)  (0.0054) 
Training * Single union    0.0018    0.0001 
   (0.0028)  (0.0025) 
R2 0.44  0.44  0.44  0.44 
N  11628 11628 13289 13289 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  OLS estimation. Equations include the following individual covariates: gender; 
tenure; tenure squared; marital status; minority status; education (3 categories); children; disability; age (5); and occupation (8).  
Equations include the following workplace covariates: establishment age; U.K.-owned; single firm; % female workers; % part-
time workers; % manual; shift-workers; capital-labour ratio (3); employment size; market competitiveness (2); organization size   37
(2); team work; quality circles; briefing groups; information disclosure; financial participation; industry (8); and a constant term 
and 8 industry-sector dummies.  
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   38
Table 3B: Determinants of Log Hourly Pay with Training/Union Interactions 
 
  Survey 
  WERS 1998  WERS 2004 
    
Union 0.0379***  0.0319* 
 (0.0125)  (0.0168) 
Training (<1 day)  0.0314  -0.0166 
 (0.0193)  (0.0215) 
Training (1-2 days)  0.0656***  0.0577*** 
 (0.0162)  (0.0207) 
Training (2-4 days)  0.0758***  0.0394** 
 (0.0166)  (0.0160) 
Training (5-9 days)  0.0703***  0.0504** 
 (0.0206)  (0.0233) 
Training (>=10 days)  -0.0477**  -0.0046 
      (0.0212)  (0.0235) 
Training (<1 day)*union  -0.0340  -0.0101 
 (0.0276)  (0.0289) 
Training (1-2 days)*union  -0.0294  -0.0854*** 
 (0.0240)  (0.0291) 
Training (2-4 days)*union  -0.0501**  -0.0226 
      (0.0226)  (0.0238) 
Training (5-9 days)*union  -0.0528*  0.0043 
    (0.0309)  (0.0368) 
Training (>=10 days)*union  0.0670**  0.0237 
     (0.0310)  (0.0349) 
R
2 0.57 0.44 
n 17,092  13,289 
    
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  OLS estimation. Equations include the following individual 
covariates: gender; tenure; tenure squared; marital status; minority status; education (3 categories); children; 
disability; age (5); and occupation (8).  Equations include the following workplace covariates: establishment 
age; U.K.-owned; single firm; % female workers; % part-time workers; % manual; shift-workers; capital-labour 
ratio (3); employment size; market competitiveness (2); organization size (2); team work; quality circles; 
briefing groups; information disclosure; financial participation; industry (8); and a constant term and 8 
industry-sector dummies.   
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   39
Table 4:  Determinants of Labour Productivity with Full Interactions 
 
  Effect on Labour Productivity 
By Training Measure 
  Incidence Incidence Intensity  Intensity  Duration  Duration 
        
(a) WERS 1998:       
Predicted training (Ť) 0.9935*** 0.9315*** 0.0169*** 0.0154*** 0.2737*** 0.2545*** 
  (0.2569) (0.2008) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0695) (0.0681) 
Union  -0.3220   -0.3325*   -0.1849   
  (0.2043)  (0.1766)  (0.1252)  
0.0590  0.0035  0.0884   Ť * Union 
(0.1385)  (0.0041)  (0.0634)  
Single-table barg.   -1.0266*   -0.9707**    -0.2946 
   (0.5273)  (0.4290)  (0.2635) 
Joint barg.    -0.4318  -0.3779  -0.2049 
   (0.2845)  (0.2922)  (0.1935) 
Single union   -0.3153  -0.2788  -0.1946 
   (0.1958)  (0.2037)  (0.1453) 
 -0.0312  0.0107  0.0579  Ť * Single-table barg. 
 (0.1870)  (0.0082)  (0.1270) 
 0.1869  0.0045  0.1254  Ť * Joint barg.  
 (0.1538)  (0.0069)  (0.0992) 
 0.1865  0.0046  0.1209  Ť * Single union 
 (0.1444)  (0.0049)  (0.0780) 
n  1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 
        
(b) WERS 2004:       
Predicted training (Ť)  1.0484*** 1.0413***  0.0162**  0.0164**  0.1177*  0.1231* 
  (0.3767) (0.3767) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0710) (0.0705) 
Union  -0.3706  -0.2531   -0.6969*   
  (0.3425)  (0.4248)  (0.3861)  
Ť * Union  -0.0819    -0.0036    0.0683   
  (0.1506)  (0.0066)  (0.0968)  
Single-table  barg.   1.3940*  1.6178*   0.6114 
   (0.7150)  (0.8545)  (0.6773) 
Joint  barg.      -1.7050**   -1.6966*  -1.2869* 
   (0.8497)  (0.9018)  (0.6786) 
Single  union   -0.5962  -0.4260   -0.8883* 
   (0.3930)  (0.4856)  (0.4586) 
Ť * Single-table barg.    -0.6267**    -0.0212*    -0.0910 
   (0.2497)  (0.0121)  (0.1570) 
Ť * Joint barg.     0.3197    0.0247    0.2557 
   (0.2852)  (0.0158)  (0.2132) 
Ť * Single union    -0.0348    -0.0036    0.0707 
   (0.1801)  (0.0074)  (0.1128) 
n  1297 1297 1329 1329 1329 1329 
Notes: Probit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Predicted training is based on training incidence (columns (1) and 
(2)), training intensity (columns (3) and (4)), and training duration (columns (5) and (6)).  Equations include the following workplace 
covariates: establishment age; U.K.-owned; single firm; % female workers; % part-time workers; % manual; shift-workers; capital-
labour ratio (3 categories); employment size; market competitiveness (2); organization size (2); team work; quality circles; briefing 
groups; information disclosure; financial participation; industry (8); and a constant term and 8 industry-sector dummies.     
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   40
Table 5:  Determinants of Financial Performance with Full Interactions 
 
  Effect on Financial Performance 
By Training Measure 
  Incidence Incidence Intensity  Intensity  Duration  Duration 
        
(a) WERS 1998:       
Predicted training (Ť) 1.0439*** 0.9548*** 0.0182*** 0.0156*** 0.3370*** 0.3014*** 
  (0.2653) (0.2048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0709) (0.0697) 
Union  -0.0441  -0.1130  0.0535  
  (0.1979)  (0.1773)  (0.1261)  
-0.0922  0.0000  -0.0367   Ť * Union 
(0.1360)  (0.0042)  (0.0646)  
Single-table barg.   -0.6672   -1.5644***    -0.4822* 
   (0.5451)  (0.4687)  (0.2739) 
Joint barg.    0.0319  0.1630   0.3401* 
   (0.3007)  (0.3041)  (0.2003) 
Single union   -0.0267  -0.0303  0.0373 
   (0.1926)  (0.2032)  (0.1442) 
  -0.2106   0.0217**   0.1316  Ť * Single-table barg. 
 (0.1949)  (0.0092)  (0.1336) 
 0.0957  -0.0005  -0.0463  Ť * Joint barg.  
 (0.1746)  (0.0074)  (0.1079) 
 -0.0275  -0.0006  -0.0257  Ť * Single union 
 (0.1446)  (0.0050)  (0.0777) 
n  1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 
        
(b) WERS 2004:       
Predicted training (Ť)  0.4813 0.4444 0.0027 0.0022 -0.0392  -0.0384 
  (0.3743) (0.3720) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0697) (0.0696) 
Union  -0.5321   -0.8308*   -1.2274***   
  (0.3644)  (0.4810)  (0.3761)  
Ť * Union  0.1376    0.0094    0.2651***   
  (0.1625)  (0.0072)  (0.0930)  
Single-table  barg.   0.8823  0.6273  -0.2698 
   (0.7331)  (0.9315)  (0.6799) 
Joint  barg.     -3.1056***  -2.8938***  -2.2325*** 
   (0.8493)  (1.0392)  (0.7913) 
Single  union   -0.6922  -0.9035   -1.2862*** 
   (0.4346)  (0.5613)  (0.4355) 
Ť * Single-table barg.    -0.3895    -0.0073    0.1073 
   (0.2591)  (0.0126)  (0.1546) 
Ť * Joint barg.     0.8068***    0.0374*    0.4203* 
   (0.2876)  (0.0197)  (0.2545) 
Ť * Single union    0.2249    0.0099    0.2673** 
   (0.2026)  (0.0083)  (0.1061) 
n  1318 1318 1352 1352 1352 1352 
Notes: Probit estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Predicted training is based on training incidence (columns (1) and 
(2)), training intensity (columns (3) and (4)), and training duration (columns (5) and (6)).  Equations include the following workplace 
covariates: establishment age; U.K.-owned; single firm; % female workers; % part-time workers; % manual; shift-workers; capital-
labour ratio (3 categories); employment size; market competitiveness (2); organization size (2); team work; quality circles; briefing 
groups; information disclosure; financial participation; industry (8); and a constant term and 8 industry-sector dummies.     
*, **, *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.   41
Appendix Table 1:  Selected Production Function Estimates of the Effect of Training on Productivity 
Study  Data  Methodology  Training Measure  Other Controls  Findings 




of the Workforce 
(EQW) National 
Employers Survey 




Dependent variable is log 
sales. 
Total number of workers 
trained in 1993; the 
percentage of formal 
training off-the-job; and 
dummy variables for 3 
training activities 
(computer, teamwork, and 
supervisor training). 
Multiple establishment 
enterprise; age distribution of 
capital stock; labour quality; 
tenure structure of workforce; 
use of TQM or  
benchmarking; exporter; 
capacity utilization; union 
status; R&D; grades or 
communication skills 
important in recruitment. 
Numbers of workers trained currently or in 1990 has 
no effect on productivity in 1993. For manufacturing, 
the greater the proportion of time spent in formal off-
the-job training, the greater productivity. For non-
manufacturing, content of training is more important, 
especially computer training. TQM and 
benchmarking statistically insignificant throughout, 





Firm-level data for 
1993 and 1997 
(n=215) 
Cobb-Douglas production 
function framework.  
Changes in sales per unit of 
reported labour, 1993-97, 
regressed on changes in 
labour, investment, training 
investments in 1993.  
Employer-provided specific 






personnel and organizational 
policies; seven industry 
dummies; and large firm 
dummy. 
Training incidence and training intensity but not 
training expenditure are positively related to labour 
productivity.  General training but not specific 
training positively associated with labour 
productivity. Corporate and personnel innovations 
are unrelated to productivity. 





1990 survey of firms 
that applied for a 
training grant under 
the MJOB program, 
1988-89 (n=395). 
Training and output 
regressions, where the 
dependent variables are first 
differences. Output proxied 
by scrap rate.  
Annual hours of training per 
employee. 
Grant receipt; log of sales, 
employment, and wages; 
union membership; worker 
participation; incentive pay; 
grievance procedures; 
training purpose.  
Training grants increase training in year of receipt.  
Positive effects of grants and training and changes in 
training on the output measure. Results highly 
sensitive to addition of controls.  
4.  Bartel 
(1994) 
495 Compustat II 
business lines in 




function framework.  
Dependent variables: log 
labour productivity in 1986, 
and percent change in labour 
productivity 1983-96. 
Training index based on the 
presence of training 
programs for each of seven 
employee groups, plus 
percentage of employee 
groups that had a training 
program implemented after 
1983 for first difference 
estimate. 
Age of business; percent 
unionized; personnel policies 
(formal job design, formal 
performance appraisal, 
employee involvement/ 
quality circles); two-digit 
industry dummies.  
Formal training is insignificant in levels equation, 
and is unaffected by inclusion of human resource 
policies.  But new training is pro-productive in the 
first difference estimate. This is not the case for new 
human resource policies. Union coefficient estimate 
is no longer statistically significant. Indication that 
businesses operating below their expected 
productivity levels in 1983 implemented these new 
training programs. 




Panel. Cross sections 
for 1998 and 1999 
and longitudinal data 
Cobb-Douglas production 
function framework.  Cross 
section estimates of effect of 
training in 1997 on labour 
Training incidence (share of 
firms offering training); 
training intensity (number 
of trainees divided by 
Share of qualified employees; 
exporter; works council; 
state-of-the-art technical 
equipment; investment in 
In cross section, lagged training intensity (actual and 
predicted) are positively associated with labour 
productivity. The effect of formal external training 
courses is positive and statistically significant   42
for 1997-1999.  productivity levels in 1998 
and 1999.  Selection into 
training handled through a 
probit regression to calculate 
the probability that a firm 
offers training and a Tobit 
equation to predict the 
intensity of training. Fixed 
effects panel estimation using 
Black and Lynch (2001) two-
step procedure (see row 6, 
below), with and without 
selectivity correction    
number of employees; and 
training type (formal 
external courses, formal 
internal courses, training on 
the job, seminars and talks, 
job rotation, self-induced 
learning, and quality 
circles). 
information technology; legal 
form of firm; employee 
participation; teamwork; units 
with own  costs and results 
accounting; stringent hiring 
rules/incentive payments.  
throughout, although that of training on-the-job is 
negative. Selection term is negative. Panel estimates 
indicate that training intensity, formal external and 
internal courses, and self-induced learning have a 
positive and significant effect on productivity.  
Allowing for selection increases the training intensity 
coefficient estimate and those of formal training 
courses.  










function approach.  
Dependent variable: sales per 
production worker. Cross-
section estimation for 1993. 
Panel analysis for 1988-93 
involves a two-step 
procedure, using both the 
within estimator and a GMM 
estimator for the production 
function to generate in a first 
step the firm-specific time- 
invariant residual. In a second 
step this residual is regressed 
on the training measure and 
other workplace practices. 
Log number of employees 
trained. 
Workplace practices are the 
main focus of the study.  
They include TQM, 
benchmarking, number of 
managerial tiers, employees 
per supervisor, proportion of 
workers in self-manager 
teams. Training viewed as 
one such high-performance 
work system.  Other 
arguments: technology (e.g. 
capital vintage); worker 
characteristics; employee 
voice (unionization and the 
proportion of workers 
meeting regularly in groups); 
profit sharing; and 
recruitment strategies.  
Training measure statistically insignificant in cross 
section and panel estimation. Unionization 
insignificant other than in combination with TQM. 
Mixed effects of high performance work systems, 
other than benchmarking.  Pro-productive voice 
restricted to workers meeting regularly in groups.  




Panel of 94 British 
Industries, 1985-96. 
Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) data 
aggregated by three-
digit industry.  
Annual Census of 
Production data for 
capital, labour, and 
output.  Main 
Panel estimates of Cobb-
Douglas production function 
using GMM techniques.  
Subsidiary wage regression 
analysis. 
 
Training data from LFS: the 
proportion of workers in an 
industry who received 
training in a given 4-week 
period.  Flow data 
connected into a training 
stock in some estimations.  
Also a distinction drawn 
between off-the-job and on-
the-job training. 
Hours worked: labour 
turnover; gender; proxies for 
human capital (education, 
occupation, age, and tenure); 
R&D intensity; proportion of 
small firms; and regional 
composition. 
In simple OLS regressions the large positive impact 
of training on productivity falls dramatically with 
controls added. Fixed effects estimation yields highly 
significant (and increased) point estimates of training 
effect (including lagged training). GMM results for 
manufacturing with exogenous training are similar to 
fixed effects results. With allowance for endogeneity, 
training effect increases markedly and remains 
higher in dynamic specifications. Results by type of 
training suggest off-the-job training has bigger   43
analysis focuses on 
production sector.  
productivity effect. Stock measure yields more 
precise point estimates. Training effects on 
productivity are greater than their effects on wages. 
 
Notes: 
aSee also Zwick (2006)   44
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Matched Employee-Employer Samples 
 
 
WERS 1998  WERS 2004 
 
       Mean   (SD)           Mean  (SD) 
Log hourly pay  1.841 (0.534)  1.973 (0.632) 
   
During the last 12 months, how much training 
have you had, either paid for or organized by 
your employer? 
 
Training incidence (1=any; 0=none)  0.509 0.587  
Training duration (days of training)  2.86 (4.32)  2.71 (4.22) 
Training (<1 day)  0.094 0.099  
Training (1-2 days)  0.131 0.138  
Training (2-4 days)  0.191 0.182  
Training (5-9 days)  0.090 0.083  
Training (>=10 days)  0.085 0.079  
   
Union recognition  0.508 0.426  
Multiple unions, single-table bargaining  0.175 0.123  
Multiple unions, joint bargaining  0.098 0.072  
Single union  0.235 0.231  
   
N  17092  14245 
   45
Appendix Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Workplace-Level Samples 
 
  WERS 1998  WERS 2004 
  Mean SD Mean SD
Financial performance (‘better than average’=1, 0 otherwise)  0.59 0.49 0.53 0.50
Labour productivity (‘better than average’=1, 0 otherwise)  0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50
 
What proportion of experienced employees have had formal 
off-the-job training over the past 12 months? 
Training incidence (>0%=1; 0%=0)  0.82 0.38 0.86 0.34
Training intensity (100%)  0.09 0.27
Training intensity (80-99%)  0.23 0.11
Training intensity (60-79%)  0.30 0.09
Training intensity (40-59%)  0.11 0.09
Training intensity (20-39%)  0.08 0.14
Training intensity (1-19%)  0.05 0.17
Training duration (proportion trained * number of days)  41.85 36.71 30.70 31.20
 
Union recognition  0.42 0.49 0.15 0.36
Multiple unions, single table bargaining  0.11 0.31 0.03 0.16
Multiple unions, joint bargaining  0.09 0.29 0.01 0.10
Single union  0.23 0.42 0.11 0.32
 
Experience required to do job >1 month  0.71 0.46 0.63 0.48
Job security guarantees  0.27 0.44 0.02 0.14
Targets set for training  0.40 0.49 0.27 0.45
N  1100  1449 
 
 